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MAJ Michael E. Hamlet

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School of Advanced Military Studies
Command and General Staff College
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 66027

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**MILITARY OPERATIONS ON URBAN
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TRAINING COMBAT FORCES FOR THE
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY**

**A MONOGRAPH
BY
Major Michael E. Hamlet
Infantry**

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**School of Advanced Military Studies
United States Army Command and General Staff
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
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
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
Robert H. Berlin, Ph.D.

Monograph Director



LTC Robin P. Swan, MMAS

Director, School of Advanced
Military Studies



Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Director, Graduate Degree
Program

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ABSTRACT

MILITARY OPERATIONS ON URBAN TERRAIN (MOUT) THE KEY TO TRAINING COMBAT FORCES FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY BY Major Michael E. Hamlet, USA, 41 pages.

Throughout the Cold War the US Army prepared to defeat a Warsaw Pact attack into Western Europe. With the fall of the Berlin Wall came the end of the Cold War and increased involvement by the US Army in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). How the US Army should address MOOTW tasks in training while maintaining the skills necessary to fight a high intensity conflict (HIC) is an issue of much debate. This monograph examines the question of whether a tactical unit focused on High Intensity Conflict (HIC) can become proficient in tasks required in the execution of MOOTW (specifically Peace Operations) through training to successfully execute MOUT (Military Operations on Urban Terrain).

To examine this question, the monograph presents the doctrinal terms and environments of High Intensity Combat (HIC), Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and Military Operations On Urban Terrain (MOUT) to highlight the similarities and differences between them and surveys the frequency with which each has occurred since 1932. The monograph presents a summary of a comparison of sixty rifle battalion, forty-five rifle company, and fifty rifle Platoon and Squad HIC tasks from seven different division's Mission Essential Task Lists (METLs) with current US Army MOOTW Doctrine.

The monograph concludes that the majority of HIC and MOOTW tasks are redundant. Furthermore, the monograph finds that MOUT provides a unique environment in which to train infantry rifle battalions, companies, platoons and squads simultaneously for HIC and MOOTW. The monograph presents recommendations outlining changes that need to be made to the current US Army MOUT doctrine to support MOUT as a training environment for both HIC and MOOTW.

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I. Introduction

Throughout the Cold War the US Army prepared to defeat a Warsaw Pact attack into Western Europe. With the fall of the Berlin Wall came the end of the Cold War and increased involvement by the US Army in Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). Addressing the US Military Academy graduating class at West Point in May of 1993, President William Clinton stated, "You will be called upon in many ways in this new era to keep the peace, to relieve suffering, to help teach officers from new democracies in the ways of a democratic army, and still ... win our wars".¹ How the US Army should address MOOTW tasks in training while maintaining the skills necessary to fight a high intensity conflict (HIC) is an issue of much debate.

Two opinions dominate the debate on how to train MOOTW tasks. Some military professionals and academics believe that the US Army needs to conduct specialized training for MOOTW. Others believe that the US Army is versatile enough not to need specialized training. The argument for specialized training is based on the belief that MOOTW environment and tasks are fundamentally different from HIC. Advocates for specialized training highlight its necessity by pointing out that the purpose for traditional infantry training, focused on an HIC environment scenario, is to close with and destroy enemy forces in any environment. Conversely MOOTW environment scenarios require the minimizing of

casualties and collateral damage.² A Department of Defense Inspector General report supports this by concluding that "combat skills, proficiency and discipline are fundamental for success in peace operations, but those qualities alone are insufficient to ensure adequate preparation for such operations"³.

Opponents to separate training argue that when an infantry battalion conducts a peacekeeping or other MOOTW mission, rifle squads, platoons, companies execute the identical tasks to those required in the execution of their HIC missions. Supporting this assertion, the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) published a report which listed eighteen critical individual skills necessary for peacekeeping. Twelve of the eighteen tasks were identical to HIC tasks found in current manuals and routinely trained as part of standing Mission Essential Task Lists (METLs)⁴. Opponents to specialized MOOTW training believe that units and leaders trained for war can easily operate in a MOOTW believing that most HIC and MOOTW tasks are redundant. What is different is that a MOOTW environment requires leaders and soldiers to execute these tasks with greater forethought and restraint than would be the case in a HIC environment.⁵

Major Christopher J. Rizo, in a SAMS monograph written in 1996 addressed this training debate and the need for specialized training programs. He recommended the inclusion of MOOTW tasks into training manuals and programs. This inclusion would eliminate the requirement for the pre and post MOOTW training that

the US Army currently conducts for all units participating in MOOTW missions. This recommendation was made so that light forces could develop training plans to prepare soldiers and leaders simultaneously for HIC and MOOTW environments. Major Rizo identified that units tend to separate training for combat from that of MOOTW and that this was a dilemma for trainers. However, Major Rizo made no concrete recommendations on how to solve this problem. Furthermore, he limited his study to light forces.

This monograph examines the issue of how to address MOOTW tasks in training while maintaining the skills necessary to fight a HIC. The question this monograph attempts to answer is: Can a tactical unit focused on High Intensity Conflict (HIC) become proficient in tasks required in the execution of MOOTW (specifically Peace Operations) through training to successfully execute MOUT (Military Operations on Urban Terrain)? To examine this question, the monograph presents the doctrinal terms and environments of High Intensity Combat (HIC), Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and Military Operations On Urban Terrain (MOUT) to highlight the similarities and differences between them and surveys the frequency with which each has occurred since 1932. The monograph presents a summary of a comparison of sixty rifle battalion, forty-five rifle company, and fifty rifle Platoon and Squad HIC tasks from seven different division's Mission Essential Task Lists (METLs) with current US Army MOOTW Doctrine. Lastly,

the monograph offers some conclusions and provides some recommendations.

II. A Common Understanding

Army Chief of Staff General Dennis J. Reimer in 1996 published "Army Vision 2010", presenting the US Army's vision of the twenty-first century. This document templated how the US Army will prioritize resources, train and organize for the challenges presented by the world security environment and the United States security policy in the twenty first century.⁶ As the Army's second priority, after fighting and winning the nation's wars, "Army Vision 2010" states that the army must be capable of "providing a range of military operations short of war".⁷

Military operations short of war is not a doctrinal term, however Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) is a doctrinal term that includes any activity that the military uses any of its capabilities short of war⁸. The doctrinal terms and environments of High Intensity Combat (HIC), Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) and Military Operations On Urban Terrain (MOUT) are key to the debate of how the US Army should address MOOTW tasks in training while maintaining the skills necessary to fight a high intensity conflict (HIC).

High Intensity Combat (HIC) operations are traditional force on force conventional combat operations. Opposing forces are characteristically organized with a set command structure, a standardized doctrine and standardized equipment. The HIC battlefield is characterized by high volumes of fire and lack of a

distinct FEBA or FLOT trace. Firepower and maneuver are the dominate features of HIC operations.⁹ Conversely these two features are the least important in MOOTW.

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) can be conducted in any environment at any time. Usually the activities are conducted in conjunction with economic, political or diplomatic activities as part of an operational or strategic plan.¹⁰ The most commonly executed subset of MOOTW is Peace Operations. Peace Operations are those missions planned resourced and executed in support of diplomatic activities either to keep the peace or enforce the peace. Peace Enforcement is the application of military force, or the threat of its use to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Peacekeeping Operations are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement. Peacekeeping Operations are usually conducted simultaneously with or in conjunction with Peacemaking and Peace Building Operations that are also component operations of Peace Operation. These are predominately diplomatic in nature involving mediation and negotiation to end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to it and rebuild governmental infrastructure and institutions to avoid a relapse into conflict.¹¹ The predominant role that

political, diplomatic and economic activities have in MOOTW greatly alters its environment from that of HIC.

The environment in which MOOTW and Peace Operations are conducted is less well defined than that of war. In a MOOTW environment the relationship between specific peace operations and political objectives may be more sensitive, direct and transparent.¹² Simultaneously, the identity of belligerents may be uncertain and the relationship between a specific operation and a campaign plan may be more difficult to define than would normally be the case in war.

The uncertainty of the identity of belligerents means that US forces involved in peace operations most likely will not meet with large or professional armies. Belligerents in a MOOTW environment may not even be organized groups; they may be groups of irregulars, terrorists, or spontaneously formed groups of the general population. Some of these groups of irregulars may attempt to provoke the general population and criminal syndicates may also be involved.¹³ Belligerents found in MOOTW usually have very strong ties with and support from the civilian population. These strong ties mean that the traditional elements of combat power may not apply to peace operations. Hence the nonviolent application of military capabilities, such as civil-military information and psychological operations (PSYOP) may be more important than the traditional military use of force.¹⁴

Civil-military information and psychological operations (PSYOP) have a greater role in MOOTW than HIC because they deal with the political and cultural dimensions of the area of operation which play an important role in MOOTW. In a MOOTW environment where an overemphasis on firepower may be counterproductive the political and cultural dimensions of the battlefield become more critical to the conflict. In those situations, when force must be used in a MOOTW environment, its purpose is to protect life or compel, not to destroy unnecessarily.¹⁵

The appropriateness of the use of force is most difficult to determine in urban areas where belligerents and noncombatants are closely located and intermingled. When confronted with this situation, units must conduct Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT). MOUT is defined in FM 101-5-1 as all military actions planned and conducted on a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain where man-made construction is the dominate features. MOUT includes combat in cities that is that portion of MOUT involving house-to-house and street-to-street fighting in towns and cities.¹⁶

However, house-to-house and street-to-street fighting are only a very small aspect of MOUT. The MOUT environment is also characterized by "large numbers of noncombatants, a high political profile, short engagement ranges, devastating casualty rates, a dense battlefield, rapid consumption of ammunition."¹⁷

Additionally, urban areas restrict mobility and inhibit communications. In a large number of third world countries the majority of political, economic, social, religious power along with a substantial percentage of the country's population is concentrated in a single urban area. This concentration not only creates extremely large and complex urban areas but also may make it the country's center of gravity.¹⁸ These factors make MOUT a very difficult and resource intensive environment in which to operate.

"Army Vision 2010" strongly implies that "providing a range of military operations short of war" is a new requirement for the US Army.¹⁹ Conversely, examination of the history of the US Army reveals that MOOTW, particularly Peace Operations (PO) and MOUT are not infrequent or new environments for the United States Army. During the period of 1932 to 1991 the Army participated in at least twenty-one MOOTW missions to include operations in Lebanon (1958), the Dominican Republic (1965) and Egypt with the Multi Forces Observer mission (MFO) since 1982.²⁰

What is new is the number, pace, scope and complexity of more recent operations. In the period between 1991 and 1998 the US Army participated in six distinctly different Peace Operations. These operations include Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, Macedonian, Bosnia²¹ and continued involvement in the MFO.²²

Overall, in the period between 1932 and 1998 the US Army participated in six HICs (WW II, Korea, Vietnam, Granada, Panama,

and the Persian Gulf). In the same period the US Army participated in twenty-seven MOOTW missions, not including numerous domestic support operations such as relief operations after Hurricane Andrew. Of the six HIC, five required MOUT, only the Persian Gulf War did not require US Army forces to conduct MOUT. However, MOUT operations in the Persian Gulf War were conducted by allied forces in Kuwait City and Khafji. MOUT was also required in eighteen out of the twenty-seven MOOTW operations.²³ Two relevant examples of MOUT in a MOOTW environment occurred during the US Army's involvement in Somalia from 15 August 1992 to 31 March 1994.²⁴

The United States became involved in Somalia to provide humanitarian relief to over a million starving people. Drought and civil war created conditions in Somalia that appalled the world and produced political pressure within the U.N. for action. Initial relief efforts by the United Nations and private organizations were quickly overwhelmed by the demand and gangs, fighting for warlords, who stole relieve supplies in the attempting to gain control of the country.²⁵

The United States Involvement in Somalia had three distinct phases, the first was a humanitarian aid effort named Operation Provide Relieve from 15 August to 9 December 1992. The second phase was Operation Restore Hope, a humanitarian aid mission combined with limited defensive military actions lasted from 9 December 1992 to 4 May 1993. The last phase of United States

involvement was as part of UNISOM II, a peace enforcement mission which lasted from 4 May 1993 to 31 March 1994²⁶.

Humanitarian aid during Operation Provide Relief was provided by a Joint Task Force (JTF) established under the US Central Command (CENTCOM). In total 28,000 Metric tons of supplies were airlifted to Somalia. The impact of this massive relief effort on the people who needed the aid the most was minimal. Warring factions in Somalia confiscated most of the supplies enroute from their point of arrival to distribution centers. This interdiction of relief supplies prompted Operation Restore Hope.²⁷

Operation Restore Hope tasked the US Army's 10th Mountain Division to provide ground forces to secure key facilities , provide security for food distribution points and relief convoys. The first instance in which elements of the 10th Mountain Division encountered MOUT in a MOOTW environment occurred less than thirty days after they arrived in Somalia. In this first instance 2-87 IN was tasked to secure an International Red Cross warehouse that was being looted by local civilians. The situation at the warehouse revealed hundreds of people fighting over bags of rice. After trying to take the warehouse at bayonet point and firing warning shoots, 2-87 IN withdrew leaving the supplies to the Somalis.²⁸

The second instance of US forces involved in MOUT in a MOOTW environment occurred when a Somali warlord organized an attack on

the city of Kismayu larger than the Belgium battalion located there could handle. The United Nations headquarters immediately deployed 1-22 IN from Mogadishu over 200 miles away as the UN QRF.²⁹ For the next ten days 1-22 IN conducted cordon and search missions, street patrols, roadblocks, checkpoints and disturbance control operations in and around the city of Kismayu with no hostile contact or casualties.³⁰

This examination demonstrates that MOOTW are not new to the Army and MOUT is a frequent requirement in both HIC and MOOTW environments. Historical data examined and presented indicates that US Army units are four times as likely to participate in a MOOTW operation than a HIC operation.³¹ If President Clinton in his May 1993 speech at West Point and General Reimer in his "Army Vision 2010" statement are correct in their visions of the future the frequency of MOOTW operations and their ratio to HIC operations will only increase.

With the Army's vast experience in MOOTW and the frequency in which MOOTW as occurred, the issue of how the US Army should address MOOTW tasks in training while maintaining the skills necessary to fight a high intensity conflict (HIC) would appear to have been answered. Even with the increased involvement by the US Army in MOOTW since the end of the Cold War, the US Army continues to focus training resources on HIC. Despite this focus the US Army has an overall successful record in the conduct of MOOTW operations.³² This would appear to support the argument made by

opponents for specialized MOOTW training. The premise of the argument opponents for specialized MOOTW training use, that when an infantry battalion conducts a peacekeeping or other MOOTW mission, rifle squads, platoons, companies execute the identical tasks to those required in the execution of their HIC missions is examined in chapter three.

III. Are the Opponents to Specialized MOOTW Training Correct?

The cornerstone of the opponents to specialized training argument is the claim, to be examined in this chapter, that most HIC and MOOTW tasks are redundant for infantry rifle battalions, companies, platoons and squads. This position was stated very clearly by the Deputy Commanding General for Training, Combined Arms Command, Brigadier General Joe N. Frazar, III:

"Training for peace operations should have minimal impact on a unit's primary mission of fighting and winning in combat; in fact, peace enforcement employs most combat skills. An important requirement for success in military operations other than war is the successful application of our war fighting skills. In some operations these skills may be constrained by restrictive rules of engagement and be in support of very visible political goals requiring all soldiers to understand the potential impact of their individual actions. Peace operations are not new missions and do not require major changes to mission essential task list (METL); rather, they require a better understanding of the environment in which they are conducted."³³

Jennifer M. Taw in her excellent RAND study also states that most peace operation and HIC tasks are redundant.³⁴ This chapter presents an examination of this redundancy between MOOTW and HIC tasks. This redundancy was investigated through the examination of current United States Army Doctrine, Training Manuals, and a survey of seven different division's Mission Essential Task Lists (METLs)³⁵. Presented is a composite Infantry Rifle Battalion and a composite Infantry Rifle Company METL compiled from the METLs examined. These composite METLs were then compared with MOOTW

tasks specified by current US Army doctrine. This examination was done to determine if as Brigadier General Joe N. Frazar, III, Jennifer M. Taw and other opponents to specialized MOOTW training profess that most peace operation and HIC METL tasks are redundant


A Unit Mission Essential Task List (METL) is the complete listing of missions and tasks identified as being critical to a unit's war time mission. A METL allows commander's to focus and prioritize training and resources, even though METL tasks themselves are not prioritized nor are their development resource constrained. A battalion's METL is developed jointly by the battalion and brigade commanders. A company's METL is likewise developed jointly by the battalion and company commanders. The developed battalion METL is based on the brigade's wartime missions, brigade battle tasks and guidance from the division commander. A company METL is based on the battalion's wartime missions and applicable standard operating procedures (SOPs), battalion battle tasks and guidance from the brigade commander.³⁶

The two basic inputs to METL development are the unit's wartime operations and contingency plans. The missions and plans are the basis for determining tasks vital to be trained on if there is war. Additional sources that contributing to the formation of a unit METL are mobilization plans and deployment plans.³⁷ Commanders analyze the unit's war time plans, applicable tasks contained in external directives and select for training

only those tasks vital to accomplishment of their unit's wartime mission. This selection process reduces the number of tasks the unit must train and concentrates the unit's peacetime unit's training efforts on the most important collective training tasks required to accomplish the wartime mission. The compilation of tasks critical for wartime mission accomplishment is the unit's METL.³⁸

There is no standard US Army METL; they vary from unit to unit because of different wartime missions. Geography may also affect the determination of METL tasks based on the environment where the wartime mission is anticipated to be executed.³⁹ After approval of a subordinate unit's METL, commanders select battle tasks. A battle task is a subordinate unit's mission essential task that will determine the success of the next higher unit's mission essential task. Each METL task has Battle tasks. The designation of battle tasks enables commanders to set priorities for scarce training resources. Examples of these scarce resources are ammunition, training areas and funds.

METL Development Process



A survey of the infantry battalions and companies Fiscal Year 1995 METLs from the 1st ID, 2nd ID, 3rd ID, 4th ID, 10th ID, 82nd ABN Div and 101st ASSLT Div reveal that they are combat focused with only units from the 10th ID, 82nd ABN Div and the 101st ASSLT Div including any MOOTW specific tasks on their METL.⁴⁰ From the comparison of these METLs generic infantry rifle battalion and company level METLs were developed. These generic METLs were developed by comparing unit's METLs and determining which tasks were most common.

These common tasks which comprise the generic METLs developed were the tasks used in comparing HIC and MOOTW tasks. The generic battalion METL developed contained the eight most common tasks found in the battalion METLs examined.⁴¹ Unique METL tasks listed

on the airborne, air assault and light units METLs such as perform NEO and conduct an airborne assault were not included in the generic battalion METL. An examination of these unit METLs also revealed two distinct Company level METLs, one for a Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) and one for a Rifle Company. The generic HHC METL developed contained the ten most common tasks found in the HHC company METLs examined⁴² and the generic METL for a rifle company contained the eight most common tasks found in the rifle company METLs examined.⁴³ As in the examination of the battalion METLs; the airborne, air assault and light company's METLs also included unique tasks such as perform NEO and conduct an airborne assault which were not included in the generic company level METL developed.

With the exception of perform NEO, none of the unit METLs examined contained any MOOTW specific tasks. This is particularly noteworthy in light of the historical analysis discussed in chapter one. Field Manual 100-23 specifies key subjects that should be included in unit training programs for Peace Operations (PO). These topics are categorized as either Peacekeeping or Peace Enforcement.⁴⁴ None of these topics was contained in the unit METLs examined either as a METL task nor as a battle task.

METL tasks were further examined to determine if they were redundant in both an HIC and MOOTW environment. Criteria established determined whether a task could be successfully executed in accordance with conditions, task standards and

performance measures as published in the appropriate Mission Training Plan (MTP)⁴⁵ within either an HIC or MOOTW environment. The first criteria was; conditions and task standards specified in the appropriate MTP were adaptive to restrictive rules of engagement (ROE). Second, task steps and performance measures did not require the executing unit or soldier to use force to successfully execute the task. The use of force was determined to be such an event as deliver well aimed fire, shift indirect fire on the target or destroy enemy force.

Examination of tasks contained in the generic unit METLs, using the above criteria, reveals there is almost a complete redundancy between Peace Enforcement and HIC tasks. Examples of this redundancy are; fight a meeting engagement, movement to contact, search and attack, perform air assault, conduct a raid, attack and defend. Less apparent is the redundancy of tasks that are not METL tasks but sub tasks or battle tasks and their associated training which are routinely trained. Examples of these tasks are establishment of lodgments, relief in place, mine and booby trap training and awareness, checkpoint operations, patrolling, staff training, and ROE.

Further redundancy occurs with collective tasks and individual tasks such as establish and operate observation posts, conduct reconnaissance patrols, establish checkpoints, conduct vehicle patrols, establish and occupy observation posts, observe ground, air and sea activities within the area of responsibility.

Redundancy also occurs in tasks not only contained in MTPs but also in unit Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs). Examples of these tasks are establish platoon-sized battalion reserve, quick reaction force (QRF), provide force reserve, provide commander with liaison officers.

Although, examination of tasks contained in the generic unit METLs revealed there was almost a complete redundancy between Peace Enforcement and HIC tasks redundancy between Peacekeeping and HIC tasks is not as obvious nor complete. Even in those Peacekeeping tasks that appear to be redundant with HIC tasks there are differences in the execution of these tasks. This difference is derived from the difference in the environment regarding the employment of force. The environment is a substantial influence or portion of the condition under which a task is trained, evaluated and executed to a published standard.

Peacekeeping tasks like Peace Enforcement tasks are redundant with HIC tasks in many less than obvious ways. HIC tasks that are not redundant in Peacekeeping are the maneuver tasks that are the most redundant in Peace Enforcement. These are the tasks of fight a meeting engagement, movement to contact, search and attack, conduct a raid and attack. All of these the task steps and performance measures required the executing unit or soldier to use force to successfully execute the task. These tasks are designed to overwhelm any opposition with superior firepower and maneuver. The use of such force is contrary to the very conditions and

purpose of Peacekeeping Operations as described in US Army, Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations.⁴⁶.

To this point the examination of METL tasks supports the assertion by opponents of specialized MOOTW training that when an infantry battalion conducts a peacekeeping or other MOOTW mission, rifle squads, platoons, companies execute the identical tasks to those required in the execution of their HIC missions. However there are some significant differences. For example, perform air assault is a redundant task at the battalion, company and platoon level. In a HIC environment it is common practice for the battalion preparation of a Landing Zone to involve preparatory indirect field artillery fires. However, in a MOOTW environment depending on the situation and Rules of Engagement preparatory fires are not used. The assets to provide such fires may not be available. This situation can be imagined in a HIC environment where for a variety of reasons preparatory fires are not used. The difference in execution of Perform Air Assault and all other tasks that involve the use of force is that the application of force is not automatic in any MOOTW environment.

Even though preparatory fires are a routine practice in conducting an air assault, tasks and standards for Perform an Air Assault as described in ARTEP 7-20 MTP (Mission Training Plan) do not include fire support planning or execution as a task.⁴⁷ Every one of the fifty-seven subtasks specified are directly applicable to either an HIC or MOOTW environment. What is different is the

conditions under which an Air Assault maybe conducted in an MOOTW environment as opposed to an HIC environment.

Conditions portrayed in ARTEP 7-20 MTP assume the presence of a hostile organized enemy force intent on disrupting or preventing the successful completion of an Air Assault.⁴⁸ In a MOOTW environment belligerents may not even be organized groups they may be groups of irregulars, terrorists, or spontaneously formed groups of the general population. As a result, an overemphasis on firepower may be counterproductive.⁴⁹

Additional differences are the emphasis of MOOTW specific component tasks within standard tasks. An example of this situation in which specific component tasks within a standard task is establish a roadblock/checkpoint. This task is a rifle platoon and squad collective task or battle task within defend and security operations.⁵⁰ This task is usually trained as a position established at critical locations such as a tactical operations center (TOC) or Brigade Support Area (BSA) for traffic control. Separate from these applications roadblocks maybe established on high speed avenues of approach within the framework of a defend or security operation.

In a MOOTW environment establish a roadblock/checkpoint has many similar applications.⁵¹ However, a greater emphasis is placed on the sub-task inspecting vehicles. Whereas in a HIC training environment this is usually a cursory inspection of personnel, in a MOOTW environment greater detail is required and

an additional emphasis is placed on searching for contraband and for explosives. Searching for contraband and explosives is not a standard subtask with defined tasks conditions and standards found in most METLs, battle tasks or Mission Training Plans (MTP). This is an excellent example of the subtle differences between seemingly redundant tasks when executed in a MOOTW environment as opposed to a HIC environment. However, an increased emphasis on force protection and the development of specific tasks, conditions and standards is incorporating more of these tasks in standard METLs and Battle Tasks. These subtle differences such as inspecting vehicles for explosives requires additional training resulting directly from the unique aspects of the MOOTW environment. This situation is at the core of proponents for special MOOTW training argument, that the MOOTW environment fundamentally different from HIC. Additionally they believe that MOOTW tasks are fundamentally different from HIC.

Examination revealed that MOOTW includes a number of tasks that appear unique.⁵² Each of these tasks has MOOTW unique aspects particularly at the battalion level or above. However, again most sub tasks are the same tasks that are trained in traditional HIC METL tasks. The difference again is that regarding the application of force. An example of a MOOTW task that appears to be unique is the task of protect humanitarian relief efforts. Essentially this is a standard HIC security operation. This task includes the common HIC tasks of Convoy escort and establish a

parameter. Although some MOOTW tasks are labeled differently than HIC tasks or operations they are almost entirely composed of commonly trained HIC tasks. However, this is not always the case.

Analysis revealed two specific tasks which are unique to MOOTW. These MOOTW tasks are negotiation and moderating.⁵³ There is no redundancy between these tasks at the battalion level and below in a HIC environment. These two tasks are individual tasks which all personnel, particularly senior commanders, need to be proficient in. These tasks are also critical subtasks of other MOOTW tasks such as Separating warring factions and Demilitarization of forces and geographical areas in a nonpermissive environment.⁵⁴ The tasks of negotiation and moderating have applicability in a traditional HIC environment at the JTF or CINC level. In a MOOTW environment these tasks are as applicable to a Sergeant occupying a check-point as to JTF Commander at a Joint Military Council meeting involving all parties in a MOOTW environment. These two critical tasks require specific training of which most units are not prepared to organically or capable of conducting.

The MOOTW tasks of negotiation and moderating support the argument for specialized training based on the belief that MOOTW environment and tasks are fundamentally different from HIC. Analysis of these two tasks also support a Department of Defense Inspector General report supports this by concluding that "combat skills, proficiency and discipline are fundamental for success in

peace operations, but those qualities alone are insufficient to ensure adequate preparation for such operations" ⁵⁵. However, the comparison of Peace Enforcement to sixty Battalion, forty-five Company, and fifty Platoon and Squad HIC tasks specified in the applicable MTPs and generic METLs that were analyzed thirty-four Battalion, forty-three Company and forty-two Platoon and Squad HIC tasks were completely redundant in both HIC and MOOTW environments. Nine Battalion, two Company and one Platoon and Squad HIC tasks were found to be partially redundant. The degree of redundancy or lack of is completely related to the degree in which the task involves the use of force or deals with Nuclear, Biological, Chemical warfare.

Additionally, the comparison of Peacekeeping to sixty Battalion, forty-five Company, and fifty Platoon and Squad HIC tasks specified in the applicable MTPs and generic METLs that were analyzed thirty-nine Battalion, twenty-nine Company and thirty Platoon and Squad HIC tasks were completely redundant in both HIC and MOOTW environments. Eleven Battalion, thirteen Company and sixteen Platoon and Squad HIC tasks were not redundant. Ten Battalion, three Company and four Platoon and Squad HIC tasks were found to be partially redundant. The degree of redundancy or lack of is completely related to the degree in which the task involves the use of force or deals with Nuclear, Biological, Chemical warfare.

This examination of battalion, company, platoon and squad tasks supports the opponents to separate training argument that when an infantry battalion conducts a peacekeeping or other MOOTW mission, rifle squads, platoons, companies execute the identical tasks to those required in the execution of their HIC missions.⁵⁶

This analysis than has verified that, FM 100-23 (Peace Operations) correctly points out that "most facets of normal military operation apply to peace operations, particularly personnel discipline. In essence the difference between the two environments is one of conditioning and priority. "⁵⁷. In a HIC environment soldiers are conditioned to apply force without thought, as an automatic response. Battle Drills are an excellent example of this automatic response. In a MOOTW environment the application of force may not be allowed and if it is, only after certain conditions have been met, not as an automatic response.

In a HIC the focus in planning an execution is on forcing opposing forces to comply through the application of force. In a MOOTW environment the focus on planning and execution is on convincing opposing forces to comply through negotiation and moderating with the possible threat of the use of force as a motivating factor. Most often it is not the application of force, but the credibility to apply force if required which builds confidence and reinforces the negotiation and moderating process between belligerents.

Training then needs to focus not on tasks, but on the differences in a MOOTW environment which requires leaders and soldiers to execute these tasks with greater forethought and restraint than would be the case in a HIC environment. . This, contrary to other evidence presented, supports the need for specialized training. The purpose of traditional infantry training, focused on an HIC environment scenario, is to close with and destroy enemy forces in any environment, while conversely MOOTW environment scenarios require the minimizing of casualties and collateral damage.⁵⁸ This being the case, how the should US Army address MOOTW tasks in training while maintaining the skills necessary to fight a high intensity conflict?

IV. MOOTW Training and MOUT, Is there a connection?

"Many of the skills that enable a unit to accomplish its primary mission, such as intelligence and observation and reporting, apply in peace operations. Training to enhance these skills should be part of the predeployment training program."⁵⁹ Accordingly, units currently participating in MOOTW conduct extensive training on MOOTW tasks before execution. Examples of this are the MFO and Dessert Sentry predeployment train-up and post deployment retraining programs.⁶⁰

This training is viewed as mission essential inspite of the task redundancy illustrated.⁶¹ The army's philosophy for MOOTW training is flexible with training tailored to the specific unit and specific MOOTW mission. Training programs are based on how well-required MOOTW skills are developed and maintained which is a function of a variety of factors that vary from unit to unit including for example type and complexity of the MOOTW mission and the current level of training.⁶²

Unit MOOTW training programs, regardless of the unit size, are generally divided into three phases. These phases are predeployment training, employment training and post redeployment training.⁶³ For an infantry battalion the first phase usually occurs over a six to eight week period, the second, usually occurs over a two to six weeks and the third generally occurs over a six to ten week period. In total MOOTW training consumes fourteen to

twenty-four weeks in addition to the MOOTW mission itself.⁶⁴ This time line varies depending on the size and type of the unit deploying, mission requirements and current level of training. This timeline does not consider time required for the preparation of personnel, formation of a rear detachment, storage of unit and personal property week period depending on the size and type of the unit deploying.⁶⁵

Predeployment training primarily emphasizes the development of mission-unique skills and those METL mission skills that cannot be maintained during the period of employment. Routine training events such as the Expert Infantry Badge (EIB) and Expert Field Medic Badge (EFMB) testing, Common Task Testing (CTT), marksmanship, and squad and platoon field training exercises (FTXs) are usually included in this phase.⁶⁶

The second phase is generally Employment Training with emphasis on the further refinement of both individual and collective mission-unique skills. Depending on resources available, training during this phase also focuses on the maintenance of HIC skills, capitalizing on training opportunities available in the mission area. This phase generally includes a leave period for deploying personnel if time permits. Training events during this period may include company and battalion FTXs and can, depending on the unit's location a rotation to either the Joint Readiness Training Center or Combat Maneuver Training

Center. Both of the facilities offer specific rotation scenarios designed and resourced to portray MOOTW environments.

The third phase is generally Post Redeployment Training. This phase is designed to enable the unit to regain skills pertinent to METL readiness that deteriorated during employment such as gunnery. Most often this phase is completed with a rotation to a CTC focused on METL tasks.⁶⁷ MOOTW collective training does not generally include those tasks usually found in Peace Enforcement missions.⁶⁸ These tasks are those which are most apparent as being redundant in both HIC and MOOTW environments and are most likely those in which a unit is most trained and proficient.

MOOTW training is designed to enhance skills that enable a unit to accomplish its primary mission, such as intelligence and observation and reporting, apply in peace operations."⁶⁹ Training programs are focused on the execution of redundant tasks with conditions and standards found in a MOOTW environment. Notably missing is any mention of training on the critical tasks of negotiation and moderating. The intent of MOOTW training is to educate and train soldiers in the differences that exist between a MOOTW and HIC environment. Training soldiers to ignore the training to apply force without thought, as an automatic response takes time and focused training under MOOTW conditions. This change in conditioning is the challenge to MOOTW training. This

same challenge faces leaders in training units for Military Operations On Urban Terrain (MOUT).

MOUT not only includes combat in cities that is that portion of MOUT involving house-to-house and street-to-street fighting in towns and cities but any operation undertaken in an urban environment.⁷⁰ HIC tasks executed in MOUT remain the same but MOUT environment under which they are executed creates conditions which are different from those traditional found in an HIC environment.⁷¹

The MOUT environment is characterized by "large numbers of noncombatants, a high political profile, short engagement ranges, devastating casualty rates, a dense battlefield, rapid consumption of ammunition."⁷² Additionally, urban areas restrict mobility, inhibit communications. In a large number of third world countries the majority of political, economic, social, religious power along with a substantial percentage of the country's population is concentrated in a single urban area. This not only creates extremely large and complex urban areas but also may make it the country's center of gravity.⁷³

As in MOOTW, forces involved in MOUT may not meet with large professional armies or even organized groups responding to a chain of command. Instead, they may have to deal with groups of irregulars, terrorists, or other conflicting segments of a population as predominant forces.⁷⁴ The close link desired by such elements and the civilian population means that just like in MOOTW traditional elements of combat power may not apply to MOUT for the

same reasons. The nonviolent application of military capabilities, such as civil-military information and psychological operations (PSYOP) may be more important than the traditional aspects of combat power.⁷⁵

However, current MOUT doctrine and training is focused on the application of force as restrained by rules of engagement (ROE) and the Law of Land Warfare as applicable to MOUT. All HIC tasks are applicable to a MOUT environment and the vast majority of these tasks are redundant with those required to execute MOOTW. In a MOUT environment soldiers and units must not only be trained in how to close with and destroy an enemy force but how to deal with civilian noncombatants and civil issues such as infrastructure support and humanitarian relief. These multiple dimensions presented by MOUT make it ideally suited for simultaneously training for HIC and MOOTW.

To train effectively for MOUT a tactical unit must train not only generic METL tasks⁷⁶ but also MOOTW tasks.⁷⁷ Training in a MOUT environment exploits not only HIC - MOOTW task redundancy but also key aspects of both HIC and MOOTW environments and incorporates tasks from both HIC and MOOTW that are not redundant. As a result, training in MOUT addresses the argument for specialized training based on the belief that MOOTW environment and tasks are fundamentally different from HIC. MOUT like MOOTW environment scenarios require the minimizing of casualties and collateral damage. Additionally MOUT addresses opponents to

specialized MOOTW training who believe that units and leaders trained for war can easily operate in a MOOTW believing that most HIC and MOOTW tasks are redundant. What is different is that a MOOTW like a MOUT requires leaders and soldiers to execute these tasks with greater forethought and restraint than would be the case in a HIC. The answer to the debate of how the US Army should address MOOTW tasks in training while maintaining the skills necessary to fight a high intensity conflict (HIC) appears to be MOUT.

V. Is MOUT the answer?

For MOUT to be the solution to the debate of how the US Army should address MOOTW tasks in training while maintaining the skills necessary to fight a HIC it must satisfy the US Army doctrinal training principles set forth in the Field Manual (FM) twenty-five series and MTP series of manuals. These principles provide guidance and direction for trainers in providing beneficial and realistic training while conserving critical resources.

For MOUT to be a viable environment in which to train units for both HIC and MOOTW it must allow units to train as a combined arms and service team. MOUT facilitates this by providing an environment that allows for the execution of all HIC and MOOTW tasks. This allows units to train as they will fight. To further facilitate this MOUT enables trainers to replicate, as closely as possible, the actual environment in which units will operate. This is accomplished through the integration of smoke, noise, simulated NBC, battlefield debris, casualties and role players.⁷⁸

Units can train to standard using the appropriate HIC or MOOTW mission training plan, drill book, or other doctrinal manual in MOUT by using various rules of engagement. This facilitates the development and execution of tough, realistic, intellectually and physically challenging training strategies which allow units

to perform critical tasks and operations. This enables units to maintain proficiency and be flexible enough for units to train on specific tasks. Furthermore this facilitates multiechelon training techniques. This is the most effective use of time and resources for training in that trainers can simultaneously train individuals, leaders and units at each echelon of the organization.

The multidimensional aspect of MOUT satisfies the US Army doctrinal training principles in both HIC and MOOTW environments. MOUT requires US forces to deal with large numbers of noncombatants and high political profile in an environment where an overemphasis on firepower may be counterproductive. Simultaneously to train for MOUT units must execute all their traditional METL tasks while also executing those tasks which are unique to MOOTW. The MOUT environment allows units to train for HIC and MOOTW tasks while executing them in a changing environment which can reflect conditions of traditional combat scenarios or those of a MOOTW environment.

A tactical unit focused on High Intensity Conflict (HIC) can become proficient in tasks required in the execution of MOOTW (specifically Peace Operations) through training to successfully execute MOUT (Military Operations on Urban Terrain). Historical analysis reveals that MOOTW, particularly Peace Operations (PO), are not new to The United States Army. Analysis conducted has verified that, FM 100-23 (Peace Operations) correctly points out

that "most facets of normal military operation apply to peace operations, particularly personnel discipline"⁷⁹. In essence the difference between the two environments is one of conditioning and priority.

Therefore, this monograph concludes that opponents to separate training are correct in that when an infantry battalion conducts a peacekeeping or other MOOTW mission, rifle squads, platoons, companies execute the identical tasks to those required in the execution of their HIC missions. Furthermore, opponents correctly identify the difference is that a MOOTW environment requires leaders and soldiers to execute these tasks with greater forethought and restraint than would be the case in a HIC environment. The MOUT is the answer to how the US Army should address MOOTW tasks in training while maintaining the skills necessary to fight a high intensity conflict (HIC).

The relevance of training in a MOUT environment goes beyond the considerations discussed pertaining to HIC and MOOTW task redundancy and the multidimensional of MOUT that captures them. Training in a MOUT environment is also relevant because the majority of US forces are CONUS Based. This CONUS based force structure and the United State's policy of engagement make it necessary for US forces to conduct force project operations. Force projection operations required support facilities such as sea ports of debarkation and aerial ports of debarkation. These seaport and airport facilities are primarily located in or near

urban areas. Hence MOUT operations will be required under most any scenario that requires the deployment of US forces.

Current US Army MOUT doctrine embodied in FM 90-10 and FM 90-10-1 need to be updated. Military Operations on Urbanized Terrain (MOUT) is defined in FM 101-5-1 as all military actions planned and conducted on a topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain where man-made construction is the dominate features. MOUT includes combat in cities which is that portion of MOUT involving house-to-house and street-to-street fighting in towns and cities.⁸⁰

The topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain where man-made constructions that are the dominate features portrayed in FM 90-10 and FM 90-10-1 are those of central Europe. Current US Army MOUT doctrine embodied in FM 90-10 and FM 90-10-1 needs to adopt a generic urban scenario. This generic scenario must not be limited to well organized urban complexes composed of modern industrial and commercial buildings, modern infrastructure, and brick and mason houses. This generic urban scenario must also address urban sprawl, buildings and cities constructed in a manner and with materials not normally used in the United States or Europe.

The changing of the topographical complex and its adjacent natural terrain where man-made construction is the dominate features portrayed in FM 90-10 and FM 90-10-1 effect not only the nature of MOUT but also the way in which the army conducts

operations such as attack and defend. Updating the topographical complex also affects how the army employs fire and air support in MOUT. Urban sprawl, buildings and cities constructed in a manner and with materials not normally used in the United States or Europe changes how units must clear and secure urban areas.

A corner stone of current doctrine is that whenever possible urban areas are bypassed and isolated. However, if Force projection operations required support facilities such as sea ports of debarkation and aerial ports of debarkation primarily located in or near urban areas and if extremely large and complex urban areas are emerging country's center of gravity⁸¹ this cornerstone is no longer valid. Except for another conflict like Desert Storm where sea ports of debarkation and aerial ports of debarkation were secure and an allied force conducted required MOUT future operations will require US forces to conduct MOUT.

Current US Army MOUT doctrine is based on a conventional Soviet threat. MOUT doctrine must address nontraditional threats. In today's world environment, US forces involved in MOUT just like in peace operations may not meet with large professional armies or even organized groups responding to a chain of command. Instead, they may have to deal with groups of irregulars, terrorists, or other conflicting segments of a population as predominant forces. These elements will attempt to capitalize on perceptions of disenfranchisement or disaffection within the population. Criminal syndicates may also be involved.⁸²

Current US Army MOUT doctrine embodied in FM 90-10 and FM 90-10-1 need to be updated to address both HIC and MOOTW tasks. Current doctrine focuses only exclusively on HIC tasks in HIC scenarios. Current MOUT doctrine makes reference to tasks such as civil aid, support, infrastructure and dealing with the resident population. Lack of concern for these issues is a result of the doctrine being based on a European scenario with a conventional Soviet threat in which the population has most likely evacuated the area.

However, because of the close link between belligerents and the civilian population means the traditional elements of combat power may not apply to MOUT anymore than they do in MOOTW. The nonviolent application of military capabilities, such as civil-military information and psychological operations (PSYOP) may be more important.⁸³ In MOUT an overemphasis on firepower may be counterproductive. Because of the potential linkages between combatants and noncombatants, the political and cultural dimensions of the battlefield become more critical to the conflict. Hence combat forces will have to address traditional MOOTW missions like establishment of a buffer zone, monitoring of boundaries, contributions to maintenance of law and order, negotiating, assistance in rebuilding infrastructure, checkpoint operations and demilitarization of forces and geographical areas.

MOUT doctrine must be incorporated into Service schools such as Branch Basic and Advance Courses and CGSC. As result of

current doctrine regarding MOUT as an exception and that that whenever possible urban areas are by passed and isolated MOUT receives very little attention at US Army schools or Combat training centers. This has recently started to change.

The relevance of training in MOUT is more important today than in recent years. With a CONUS based force structure and the United State's policy of engagement, US forces will have to conduct force project operations that require support facilities such as sea ports of debarkation and aerial ports of debarkation. These seaport and airport facilities are primarily located in or near urban areas. Hence MOUT operations will be required under most any scenario that requires the deployment of US forces.

MOOTW doctrine must be incorporated into HIC doctrine and associated manuals. The division of MOOTW doctrine into a separate category of doctrine reinforces the perception that MOOTW is separate and distinct from traditional HIC focused activities. Separation of doctrine inspite of the demonstrated task redundancy reinforces the perception that units must train for HIC focused tasks and then train separately for MOOTW related tasks. In times of scarce resources this presents an either or type situation that does not need to exist.

In a HIC environment soldiers are conditioned to apply force without thought, as an automatic response. Battle drills are an excellent example of this automatic response. In a MOOTW environment the application of force may not be allowed and if it

is, only after certain conditions have been met, not as an automatic response. To facilitate this difference it is not a separate body of doctrine which is needed, but doctrine that presents different conditions under which redundant tasks can be trained.

¹ US Army, Force XXI Operations," Training and Doctrine Command Pamphlet 525-5, Washington DC, Headquarters Department of the Army, 1994, Pg. 1-1

² For views in favor of MOOTW training see, John P. Abizaid, "Lessons for Peace Keepers," Military Review (Mar 1993), Pg. 11-19 and Kjeld G.H. Hillingslo, Peace Support Operations and Training, A Danish Perspective, "Peace Support Operations and the US Military," Dennis J. Quinn, Washington DC, National Defense University Press, 1994.

³ Brittin, Katherine A., "Specialized Military Training for Peace Operation," Program Evaluation for The Assistant Secretary of Defense, Arlington, VA, Pg. 49

⁴ Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL), "Operations Other Than War, Peace Operations Volume IV," Newsletter 93-8, Fort Leavenworth, KS, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, December 1993, Pg. V-4

⁵ For arguments against specialized MOOTW training see Jennifer Morrison Taw, David Persselin and Maren Leed. Meeting Peace Operations' Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness. Santa Monica, CA: RAND,

1994, Jeffery D. Church, "Letters," Infantry (Mar-Apr 95), Pg. 4-5.

William J. Martinez, "Peace Operations," Infantry, May-June 94) and Sean Naylor "Well Done but Warlike It's Not," Army Times (Jul 3, 93) Pg. 10

⁶ General Dennis J. Reimer, Army Vision 2010, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington D.C. 1996 Pg. 1

⁷ Ibid., Pg. 2

⁸ US Army, Field Manual 100-5 Operations. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 1986. Pg. 2-4.

⁹ Ibid. For further information on the environment of combat see Chapter fourteen of FM 100-5 Operations Washington, DC: Department of the Army, June 1993.

¹⁰ Joint Pub 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms"

Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7) pg. V

¹¹ Ibid.

¹² Ibid. For additional information also see FM 100-23 Peace Operations. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1994.

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Ibid.

¹⁵ US Army, Field Manual 100-23. Peace Operations. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1994. Pg. v.

¹⁶ US Army, Field Manual 100-5-1/MCRP 5-2A. Operational Terms and Graphics. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, United States Marine Corps, 30 September 1997.

Pg.-100.

¹⁷ Russell W. Glenn, Combat in Hell: a consideration of constrained urban warfare, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1996, pg. 3

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ Ibid., Pg. 2

²⁰ US Army, Field Manual 100-23. Peace Operations. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1994, pg. v.

²¹ Since 1993 there have been six different Peace Operations executed by the U.N. and the United States in Bosnia. These operations are not distinctly different in that they all occurred in the Bosnia Area of Operations and dealt in one way or another with the same issues. These different operations resemble phases of one operation rather than different operations.

²² Jennifer M. Taw, David Persselin and Maren Leed, Meeting Peace Operations' Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1998, pg. 5

²³ Information regarding the number and types of events in the period 1932 to 1998 is based on information presented in Robert F. Barry, (ed.) POWER PACK: Dominican Republic, 1965-1966. Portsmouth, VA: Messenger Printing Co., 1965; John A. English, On Infantry. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1984; Michael Dewar, War in the Streets: The Story of Urban Combat from Calais to Khafji. Devon, Great Britain: David and Charles plc, 1992; Patrick O'Sullivan and Jesse W. Miller, Jr. The Geography of Warfare. New York: St. Martin's press, 1983; Jennifer Morrison Taw and Bruce Hoffman. The Urbanization of Insurgency: the potential Challenge to US Army Operations. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994; Defense Science Board. Conflict Environment Task Force (Implications of Third World Urban Involvement), May 1986; Russell W. Glenn, Combat in Hell: a consideration of constrained urban warfare, Santa Monica, CA: RAND Arroyo Center, 1996; RD. McLaurin, Military operations in the Gulf War; The Battle of Khorramshahr. Alexandria, VA, July 1982; RD. McLaurin, Modern Experiences in City Combat. Springfield, VA: March 1987; RD. McLaurin, Recent Military Operations on Urban Terrain. Alexandria, VA, July 1982; Jennifer M. Taw, David Persselin and Maren Leed, Meeting Peace Operations' Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1998; US Army, Field Manual 100-20. Military Operations in Low Intensity Conflict. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1990; US Army, Field Manual 100-23. Peace Operations. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1994.

²⁴ Kenneth Allard, Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned, National Defense University, Washington D.C. 1995 Pg. 13-14

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Ibid. Pg. 15

²⁸ Martin N. Stanton, "A riot in Wanwaylan: Lessons Learned," Army, December 1994, Pg. 25-28

²⁹ The UN QRF was a designated unit that was to be available at a moment notice to deploy as required to assist other units or relief organizations in the event of emergency..

³⁰ Patrick D. McGowan, Operations in Somalia: Changing the Light Infantry Training Focus," Infantry, September - October 1993, Pg. 23-25. For further reading see Charles P. Ferry, "Mogadishu, October 1993: Personal Account of a Rifle Company XO," Infantry, September - October 1993.

³¹ The participation of the US Army in twenty-seven MOOTW operations between 1932 and 1998 is occurrence rate 4.5 times greater than the six HIC operations which occurred in the same period.

³² Jennifer M. Taw, David Persselin and Maren Leed, Meeting Peace Operations' Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1998; Pg. 31

³³ Center of Army Lessons Learned (CALL) "Foreword", Newsletter No. 93-8, US Army Combined Arms Command(CAC), Fort Leavenworth, KS Dec 1993. For additional information on MOOTW operations CALL's Newsletter has a number of volumes devoted to MOOTW an related topics. Also see Jennifer M. Taw, David Persselin and Maren Leed, Meeting Peace Operations' Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1998; Note on Pg. 36

³⁴ Jennifer M. Taw, David Persselin and Maren Leed, Meeting Peace Operations' Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1998; Pg. 36

³⁵ FY 1995 Division, Brigade, Battalion and Company METLs examined in this monograph are from the

III Corps METL, briefing chart, Headquarters, III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas, undated (November 1995),

V Corps METL, 3rd Infantry Division (since redesignated 1st Infantry Division) briefing chart, Headquarters, V Corps, Heidelberg, Germany, undated (November 1995),

XVIII Airborne Corps METL, memorandum subject: "Fiscal Year (FY) 1997-1998 Command Training Guidance," Headquarters, XVIII Abn Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, undated (1995), 1st Armored Division METL, briefing Chart, Headquarters, 1st Armored Division, Bad Kreuznach, Germany, undated (November 1995),

1st Cavalry Division METL, memorandum subject: "Division Mission Statement and Mission Essential Task List (METL)," Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas, 1 April 1996,

1st Infantry Division METL, memorandum subject: "3d Infantry Division (since redesignated 1st Infantry Division) Mission Essential Task List," Headquarters, 1st Infantry Division, Wurzburg, Germany, November 7, 1995, 2nd Infantry Division METL, Memorandum subject: 'Third Quarter FY96 Training Guidance," Headquarters, 2nd Infantry Division, Korea, January 31, 1996,

3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division METL, briefing chart titled "3BCT Mission Statement," Headquarters, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, Fort Lewis Washington, undated, (May 1996),

4th Infantry Division METL, memorandum subject: "Revised Mission Essential Task List (METL)," with attached briefing chart, Headquarters, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Hood, Texas, April 17, 1996,

US Army Europe (USAREUR) METL, document from USAREUR internet home page, Headquarters, USAREUR, Heidelberg, Germany, undated (May 1996),

All of these documents were obtained courtesy of Jennifer M. Taw, RAND. They are the documents that she utilized in her study with David Persselin and Maren Leed, Meeting Peace Operations' Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1998.

³⁶ US Army Field Manual 25-100, Training the Force, Headquarters Department of the Army, Washington D.C. 15 Nov 1988, Pg. 2-1

³⁷ Ibid. Pg. 2-2

³⁸ Ibid. Pg. 2-3

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ III Corps METL, briefing chart, Headquarters, III Corps, Fort Hood, Texas, undated (November 1995),

V Corps METL, 3rd Infantry Division (since redesignated 1st Infantry Division) briefing chart, Headquarters, V Corps, Heidelberg, Germany, undated (November 1995),

XVIII Airborne Corps METL, memorandum subject: "Fiscal Year (FY) 1997-1998 Command Training Guidance," Headquarters, XVIII Abn Corps, Fort Bragg, North Carolina, undated (1995), 1st Armored Division METL, briefing Chart, Headquarters, 1st Armored Division, Bad Kreuznach, Germany, undated (November 1995),

1st Cavalry Division METL, memorandum subject: "Division Mission Statement and Mission Essential Task List (METL)," Headquarters, 1st Cavalry Division, Fort Hood, Texas, 1 April 1996,

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3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division METL, briefing chart titled "3BCT Mission Statement," Headquarters, 3rd Brigade Combat Team, Fort Lewis Washington, undated, (May 1996),

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⁴¹ The generic battalion METL includes the following tasks; Deploy, Defend, Attack, Perform Movement to Contact, Perform CSS Operations, C2 the Battalion, Perform Air Assault.

⁴² The generic HHC METL developed includes the following tasks; Deploy, Employ Fire Support, Screen, Perform Link-up, Perform Reconnaissance, Perform Helicopter Movement, Perform Logistical Support, Consolidate and Reorganize.

⁴³ The generic METL for a rifle company includes the following tasks; Prepare for combat, Defend, Assault, Perform Movement to Contact, Perform Log Support, Execute Air Assault, Assault Built-up areas, Perform Link-up, Consolidate and Reorganize.

⁴⁴ US Army, Field Manual 100-23. Peace Operations. Department of the Army, Washington, DC, 1994, Pg. 87 Peacekeeping (PK) tasks specified are; The nature of PK, Establishment of lodgments, Relief in Place, Regional Orientation, establishment of a buffer zone, Supervision of a truce or cease-fire, Monitoring of boundaries, Contributions to maintenance of law and order, Negotiating skills, Mine and booby trap training and awareness, Assistance in rebuilding infrastructure, Checkpoint operations, Investigating and reporting, Information collection, Patrolling, Media interrelationships, Staff training, Demilitarization of forces and geographical areas in a permissive environment and ROE. Along with the above listed subjects FM 100-23 recommends the following additional tasks be included in training for Peace Enforcement (PE) operation. Tasks specified are; Fight a Meeting Engagement, Movement to contact, Search and attack, Perform Air Assault, Enforce UN sanctions, Protect Human Rights, Protect humanitarian relief efforts, Separating warring factions, Disarming belligerent parties of heavy weapons, Restore territorial integrity, Restore law and order, Demilitarization of forces and geographical areas in a nonpermissive environment, ROE, Opening secure routes, Civil-military operations, Control of multinational units, Intelligence fusion and dissemination, NGO operations, Multinational logistics, PSYOPS, Intercultural communications, Conduct a Raid, Attack and Defend.

⁴⁵ Mission training plans provide trainers a descriptive, performance oriented training program to train their units. MTPs contain those tasks that support the unit missions outlined in other doctrinal manuals. Tasks performance measures contained in MTPs are the Army's performance measures for the execution of associated tasks. Army Training and

Evaluation Program 7-8 MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Battalion, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 29 Sep 1994 Pg. V

⁴⁶ US Army, Field Manual 100-23. Peace Operations. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1994. Pg. v

⁴⁷ Army Training and Evaluation Program 7-20 MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Battalion, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 27 Dec 1998 Pg. 5-73

⁴⁸ Army Training and Evaluation Program 7-8 MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Battalion, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 29 Sep 1994 Pg. 5-140

⁴⁹ US Army, Field Manual 100-23. Peace Operations. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1994. Pg. v

⁵⁰ Army Training and Evaluation Program 7-8 MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Battalion, Headquarters, Department of the Army, Washington, D.C., 29 Sep 1994 Pg. Pg. 5-198

⁵¹ For more information on Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad Tasks Conditions and standards, see ARTEP 7-8 MTP.

⁵² Examples of MOOTW unique tasks or tasks that at least appear unique are enforce UN sanctions, protect human rights, protect humanitarian relief efforts, separating warring factions, disarming belligerent parties of heavy weapons, restore territorial integrity, restore law and order, demilitarization of forces and geographical areas in a nonpermissive environment.

⁵³ Analysis has revealed five HIC Mobility and Survivability tasks that dependent on the threat may or may not be redundant. These five tasks are: Perform NBC Operations, Prepare for and React to a Chemical Attack, Cross a Contaminated Area, Perform hasty decontamination and Prepare for a Friendly Nuclear Strike. In today's changing world threat environment it is most likely that all of these tasks except Prepare for a Friendly Nuclear Strike will be required in the execution of MOOTW.

⁵⁴ . The MOOTW tasks of negotiation and moderating are also critical subtasks of Disarming belligerent parties of heavy weapons, Restore territorial integrity, Restore law and order.

⁵⁵ Brittin, Katherine A., "Specialized Military Training for Peace Operation, " Program Evaluation for The Assistant Secretary of Defense, Arlington, VA, Pg. 49

⁵⁶ For arguments against specialized MOOTW training see Taw, Jennifer Morrison, David Persselin and Maren Leed. Meeting Peace Operations' Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994, Jeffery D. Church, "Letters," Infantry (Mar-Apr 95), Pg. 4-5. William J. Martinez, "Peace Operations, Infantry, May-June 94) and Sean Naylor "Well Done but Warlike It's Not," Army Times (Jul. 3, 93) Pg. 10

⁵⁷ US Army, Field Manual 100-23. Peace Operations. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1994, Pg. 86

⁵⁸ For views in favor of MOOTW training see, John P. Abizaid, "Lessons for Peace Keepers, " Military Review (Mar 1993), Pg. 11-19 and Kjeld G.H. Hillingslo, Peace Support Operations and Training, A Danish Perspective, " Peace Support Operations and the US Military, Dennis J. Quinn, Washington DC, National Defense University Press, 1994.

⁵⁹ US Army, Field Manual 100-23. Peace Operations. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1994, Pg. 86

⁶⁰ The author was the training officer and Rear Detachment Commander for 2nd Battalion, 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment during its deployment to the MFO from August 1989 to February 1990, and the training officer for

2nd Battalion, 12th Infantry when it deployed two company sized elements to Dessert Sentry from October 1992 to March 1993.

⁶¹ Jennifer Morrison Taw, David Persselin and Maren Leed. Meeting Peace Operations' Requirements While Maintaining MTW Readiness. Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1994 pg. 36 - 41

⁶² Additional factors on which training programs are based are time available to train; before deployment, during employment, and upon return to home station, duration of mission and resources available to support training. Reprint of "Guidelines for Peacekeeping or Training Ops in SE Asia", XVIII Airborne Corps. CHAPTER 4: TRAINING Filename: K218 Peace Operations CD-ROM Joint Warfighting Center, June 1997, Pg. 4-1

⁶³ Ibid. The focus of these programs at the individual training level are tasks such as Survival Skills, Vehicle, Aircraft, Water Craft, Uniform and Insignia Identification, Observation and Reporting Procedures, Field Sanitation, Rules of Engagement, Safety (Integrated Training), Drown Proofing, Stress Management, Identification of Mines and Handling Procedures, First Aid and Evacuation Procedures, Terrorism Prevention Skills, Physical Security (Prevention of Pilferage and Theft), Peace-keeping Skills, Land Navigation and Range Estimation, Handling of Detainees, RTO Procedures. Pg. C-5-B-1

The focuses of these programs at the collective training level are tasks such as SCC/OP/CP Operations (observe and report), reporting formats, Slingload operations, Vehicle patrolling, TOC operations (squad level). Additional specialty training occurs for Food handler/cook, Combat Lifesavers, Field Sanitation Specialist, Generator Operators, Drivers, Mail Handlers, and Lifeguards. Pg. C-5-B-2

⁶⁴ Ibid. Pg. 4-1

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ Ibid. Task analysis conducted by the author in chapter two revealed a number of the tasks trained in MOOTW training are included in routine CTT, EIB, EFMB training and standing METL tasks. Examples are Vehicle, Aircraft, Water Craft, Uniform and Insignia Identification, Observation and Reporting Procedures, Field Sanitation, Safety (Integrated Training), Drown Proofing, Stress Management, Identification of Mines and Handling Procedures, First Aid and Evacuation Procedures, Physical Security (Prevention of Pilferage and Theft), Land Navigation/Range Estimation, Handling of Detainees, RTO Procedures.

⁶⁷ Ibid. Pg. 4-1 Training during this phase also usually includes, marksmanship, squad, platoon, company and battalion FTXs.

⁶⁸ Ibid. Pg. 4-2. . Examples of tasks not usually trained in preparation for a MOOTW mission include Fight a Meeting Engagement, Movement to contact, Search and attack, and Perform Air Assault.

⁶⁹ US Army, Field Manual 100-23. Peace Operations. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1994, Pg. 86 The keys to MOOTW training are environment education, Rules of Engagement education, rehearsal and leadership development oriented to the unique challenges of the MOOTW environment.

⁷⁰ US Army, Field Manual 100-5-1/MCRP 5-2A. Operational Terms and Graphics. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, United States Marine Corps, 30 September 1997 Pg. 1-100.

⁷¹ US Army, Field Manual 90-10. Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT). Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 15 August 1979 Pg. 111 through 1-12

⁷² Russell W. Glenn, Combat in Hell: a consideration of constrained urban warfare, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1996, pg. 3

⁷³ Ibid.

⁷⁴ Joint Pub 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms" Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7) pg. V

⁷⁵ Ibid.

⁷⁶ METL tasks such as Deploy, Defend, Attack, Perform Movement to Contact, Perform CSS Operations, C2 the Battalion, Perform Air Assault, Assault Built-up areas, Perform Link-up, Consolidate and Reorganize. For further information refer to chapters 2 through 4, US Army, Field Manual 90-10. Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT). Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 15 August 1979.

⁷⁷ MOOTW tasks such as establishment of a buffer zone, Monitoring of boundaries, Contributions to maintenance of law and order, Negotiating skills, Mine and booby trap training and awareness, Assistance in rebuilding infrastructure, Checkpoint operations, Investigating and reporting, Information collection, Patrolling, Media interrelationships, Staff training, Demilitarization of forces and geographical areas and ROE. For further information refer to chapter 5 and Appendix H, US Army, Field Manual 90-10. Military Operations on Urban Terrain (MOUT). Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 15 August 1979.

⁷⁸ US Army, ARTEP 7-8 MTP, Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Rifle Platoon and Squad, Headquarters Department of the Army. Washington, DC, 29 September 1994, Pg. 1-4

⁷⁹ US Army, Field Manual 100-23. Peace Operations. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1994, Pg. 86

⁸⁰ US Army, Field Manual 100-5-1/MCRP 5-2A. Operational Terms and Graphics. Washington, DC: Department of the Army, United States Marine Corps, 30 September 1997. Pg.-100.

⁸¹ Russell W. Glenn, Combat in Hell: a consideration of constrained urban warfare, RAND, Santa Monica, CA, 1996, pg. 3. This RAND study is an excellent discussion of MOUT, current US MOUT capabilities and shortfall.

⁸² Joint Pub 1-02, "Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms" Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7) pg. V

⁸³ Ibid.

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